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RELIGIOUS FREEDOM THROUGH MARKET FREEDOM:
THE SHERMAN ACT AND THE MARKETPLACE FOR
RELIGION

BARAK D. RICHMAN*
ABSTRACT
In prior work, I examined certain restraints by private religious
organizations and concluded that the First Amendment did not
immunize these organizations from antitrust liability. In short, the
First Amendment did not preempt enforcing the Sherman Act
against certain religious monopolies or cartels.
This Article offers a stronger argument: First Amendment values
demand antitrust enforcement. Because American religious freedoms,
enshrined in the Constitution and reflected in American history, are
quintessentially exercised when decentralized communities create
their own religious expression, the First Amendment’s religion
clauses are best exemplified by a proverbial marketplace for religions. Any effort to stifle a market organization of independent
religious institutions is inimical to First Amendment religious freedoms, and any effort to employ economic or institutional mechanisms
to engineer restraints on such freedoms is appropriately policed by
the Sherman Act. Because the Sherman Act is squarely designed to
resist unauthorized accumulations of centralized power, it is ideally
suited to counteract restraints against religious freedoms and to
liberate decentralized religious expression.

* Edgar P. & Elizabeth C. Bartlett Professor of Law and Business Administration, Duke
University. The author thanks the organizers and participants of this symposium—with
special appreciation to Nate Oman, Alan Meese, Dan Crane, Rick Garnett, and Danny
Sokol—for continued discussions and helpful feedback on this ongoing project. And special
appreciation is owed to Shane Ellement, for enormous research assistance and ongoing
friendship.
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INTRODUCTION
During the only recorded debate on the First Amendment’s
Religion Clauses in the House of Representatives, James Madison
spoke of the concern that “one sect might obtain a pre-eminence, or
two combine together, and establish a religion to which they would
compel others to conform.”1 He was referring to the danger of a government being controlled by a particular religious denomination,
and thus advocated an Establishment Clause that would prevent a
ruling coalition from imposing its religious will on others.2 But his
words also speak to the dangers of dominant sects asserting private
power—either through unilateral or cartel arrangements—and
suppressing the religious preferences of minorities through nongovernmental means.
The chief legal weapon available to combat the abuse of concentrated private authority is the Sherman Act.3 It is explicitly designed to counteract powerful economic or professional entities from
constraining the preferences and dynamism of individual creativity.4
Thus, when religious organizations pursue private arrangements to
preempt or constrain the ability of individuals or smaller groups
from pursuing their own religious freedoms, the Sherman Act is not
only an appropriate remedy but one that is naturally encouraged by
the spirit and jurisprudence underlying the First Amendment.5
This Article follows prior work that examined certain restraints
by private religious organizations and concluded that, as a doctrinal
matter, the First Amendment did not protect these organizations
from antitrust liability.6 This Article offers a stronger argument:
First Amendment values demand antitrust enforcement. Because
1. 1 ANNALS OF CONG . 731 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). The import of Madison’s
recorded remark has been appreciated by both academics and the U.S. Supreme Court. See,
e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 183-84
(2012); 1 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK , RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: OVERVIEWS AND HISTORY 606-09 (2010).
2. 1 ANNALS OF CONG ., supra note 1, at 730-31.
3. 14 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2012); see also Barak D. Richman, Saving the First Amendment from
Itself: Relief from the Sherman Act Against the Rabbinic Cartels, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1347, 135356 (2013).
4. See Richman, supra note 3, at 1349, 1353-55.
5. See id. at 1349.
6. Id. at 1355-56.
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American religious freedoms, enshrined in the Constitution and reflected in American history, are quintessentially exercised when decentralized communities create their own religious expression, the
First Amendment’s Religion Clauses are best exemplified by a proverbial marketplace for religions.
The Article first examines how the antitrust case law has developed to incorporate constitutional language, illustrating the
Sherman Act’s importance to the constitutional framework and
the natural application of antitrust law to secure constitutional
values.7 It then examines Religion Clause cases and reveals how
centrality of choice and personal preference illuminate First
Amendment jurisprudence.8 This emphasis on choice, much like the
reverence afforded to consumers in antitrust cases, is especially
heightened when religious organizations make hiring decisions—
thus acting as both religious and economic actors—as illustrated in
the ministerial exception cases.9 The Article concludes that the
Religion Clauses and the Sherman Act reinforce each other, offering
effective preservation of religious liberty against public and private authority alike.
I. PARALLEL LANGUAGES: THE SHERMAN ACT IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME
The Supreme Court’s antitrust jurisprudence closely parallels its
Establishment Clause jurisprudence’s focus on the importance of
individual choice to our constitutional scheme.10 This Part briefly
reviews the Court’s emphasis on personal choice in both its antitrust
and Establishment Clause cases.11 It then focuses on the importance
that the Court places on congregations being allowed to choose their
own clergymen free from outside influence.12

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Parts I.C. and II.B.
See infra Parts I.A-B.
See infra Parts I.A-B.
See infra Part I.C.
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A. The Quasi-Constitutional Language of the Sherman Act
When the United States Supreme Court called the Sherman Act
“the Magna Carta of free enterprise” in 1972,13 it latched onto a
telling metaphor that it has only doubled down on in the years since
that decision. The metaphor reflected the Supreme Court’s belief
that the Sherman Act amounted to more than a typical statutory
expression from Congress, but instead embodied values that reflected the core of American democracy.14 The Court’s most current
invocation of the Sherman Act in quasi-constitutional language was
its recent ruling in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission, in which the Court articulated
the relationship between the Sherman Act and the power of the
states in our federalist system.15 The Court reiterated the Sherman
Act’s centrality in our market democracy, stating that “[f]ederal
antitrust law is a central safeguard for the Nation’s free market
structures. In this regard it is ‘as important to the preservation of
economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of
Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.’”16
This language reflects the Court’s understanding that the
Sherman Act is central to the nation’s constitutional framework.17
For that reason, the North Carolina Dental Court weighed carefully
the relationship between the Act and the states.18 The majority
concluded that the Sherman Act constrains state autonomy,19
thereby benefitting the states and their citizens.20 The majority
13. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
14. See id. (“[It is] as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our freeenterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal
freedoms.”); cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., America’s Statutory “constitution”, 41 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1, 6 (2007) (“‘[S]uper-statutes’—framing statutes that set forth robust rules for
government structure, electoral activities, and public values—articulate a great many of the
applicable rules and principles of our Constitution as well as our constitution.”).
15. 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1109-12 (2015).
16. Id. at 1109 (quoting Topco, 405 U.S. at 610).
17. See Eskridge, Jr., supra note 14, at 6 (explaining the difference between “America’s
(small ‘c’) constitution” and “the U.S. (Large ‘C’) Constitution”).
18. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1109-12.
19. Id. at 1109-12, 1117.
20. Id. at 1109; see also FTC v. Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S. 621, 632 (1992) (“The
preservation of the free market and of a system of free enterprise without price fixing or
cartels is essential to economic freedom.... Continued enforcement of the national antitrust
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observed that “[t]he antitrust laws declare a considered and decisive
prohibition by the Federal Government of cartels, price fixing, and
other combinations or practices that undermine the free market.”21
Specifically, the majority noted, “[t]he Sherman Act serves to promote robust competition, which in turn empowers the States and
provides their citizens with opportunities to pursue their own and
the public’s welfare.”22 The dissent, on the other hand, speaking
more in constitutional theory than antitrust doctrine, noted the
unique constitutional role of states vis-à-vis federal antitrust
policy.23 Justice Alito, writing for the dissent, argued that “[i]n a
dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the
states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally
subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a
state’s control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be
attributed to Congress.”24 Indeed, Justice Alito continued, when the
Sherman Act was first enacted “in 1890, it would have been a truly
radical and almost certainly futile step to attempt to prevent the
States from exercising their traditional regulatory authority, and
[we have previously] refused to assume that the Act was meant to
have such an effect.”25
The case is a vivid illustration of both the frequency of constitutional language in Sherman Act jurisprudence and the constitutional elements that are central to implementing antitrust policy.26
In short, the Sherman Act has come to represent a distinct part of
the operation of our constitutional scheme, and its application is
reflected in a quintessentially constitutional debate over the degree
to which free market policies constrain state power.

policy grants the States more freedom, not less, in deciding whether to subject discrete parts
of the economy to additional regulations and controls.”).
21. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1109.
22. Id. (internal citations omitted).
23. Id. at 1119 (Alito, J., dissenting).
24. Id. (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) (alteration in original)).
25. Id.
26. See id. at 1109-112 (majority opinion).
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B. The Consumer-Oriented Language of the Religion Clauses
The Sherman Act’s quasi-constitutional status relates less to a
judicial fidelity to neoliberal notions of market efficiency than to a
deference to individual choice.27 The Court’s treatment of a consumer’s freedom relates to its treatment of other individual prerogatives in a democracy, in particular the constitutional protections
cemented in the First Amendment.28 At the heart of both the First
Amendment and the Sherman Act is the protection of individual
choice.
The language of individual choice, as an expression of individual
freedom, is central to the Court’s understanding of the Religion
Clauses. In an opinion concurring with the Court’s conclusion that
mandated prayer in public schools is unconstitutional, Justice
Brennan remarked:
The choice which is thus preserved is between a public secular
education with its uniquely democratic values, and some form of
private or sectarian education, which offers values of its own. In
my judgment the First Amendment forbids the State to inhibit
that freedom of choice by diminishing the attractiveness of
either alternative—either by restricting the liberty of the private
schools to inculcate whatever values they wish, or by jeopardizing the freedom of the public schools from private or sectarian
pressures. The choice between these very different forms of
education is one—very much like the choice of whether or not to
worship—which our Constitution leaves to the individual
parent. It is no proper function of the state or local government
to influence or restrict that election.29

The key sentence in the above excerpt deserves repeating: “In my
judgment the First Amendment forbids the State to inhibit that
freedom of choice.”30 In Justice Brennan’s eyes, the constitutional
violation occurred by denying individual choice in a setting in which
27. See id. at 1110-12.
28. See infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
29. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 242 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); see also id. at 205 (majority opinion) (holding that mandating school prayer
violated the Establishment Clause of the Constitution).
30. Id. at 242 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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various religious expressions were available.31 The centrality of
individual choice within a diversity of religions has not only been
echoed in subsequent Court rulings, but the essence of choice has
also been fused to the very foundation of First Amendment freedoms.32 The Court summarized its Religion Clause rulings in a
succinct connection between religious choices and the nation’s
constitutional fabric: “The rule of th[e]se cases, one which seems
fairly implicit in the history of our First Amendment, is that the
government may not displace the free religious choices of its citizens
by placing its weight behind a particular religious belief, tenet, or
sect.”33
In Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox
Church in North America, the Court made clear that the primacy of
religious choice applies both to individuals and religious organizations, whose autonomy to make their own decisions in accordance to
their own community values and preferences also receives dogged
constitutional protection.34 The Court emphasized that its Religion
Clause cases embody “a spirit of freedom for religious organizations,
an independence from secular control or manipulation—in short,
power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters
of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.”35
It is no accident that the so-called ministerial exception is traced
most directly to Kedroff ’s proclamation that “[f]reedom to select the
31. See id.
32. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002) (“[The Court’s
jurisprudence] make[s] clear that where a government aid program is neutral with respect
to religion, and provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct
government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent
private choice, the program is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment
Clause.”); Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 490-91 (1986) (Powell,
J., concurring) (“[S]tate programs that are wholly neutral in offering educational assistance
to a class defined without reference to religion do not violate the [Establishment Clause],
because any aid to religion results from the private choices of individual beneficiaries.”);
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399 (1983) (“[U]nder Minnesota’s arrangement, public funds
become available only as a result of numerous private choices of individual parents of schoolage children.”).
33. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 733
(1976).
34. 344 U.S. 94, 116, 119-21 (1952).
35. Id. at 115-16. Kedroff also relies heavily on the language of choice. See id. at 119
(remarking that the state law in question was unconstitutional because it “prohibit[ed] the
free exercise of an ecclesiastical right, the Church’s choice of its hierarchy”).
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clergy, where no improper methods of choice are proven, we think,
must now be said to have federal constitutional protection as a part
of the free exercise of religion against state interference.”36 The
ministerial exception emerged from a series of circuit court rulings
that exempted certain religious organizations from generally
applicable employment laws, such as Title VII.37 Motivated by the
Religion Clauses’ charge to protect religious organizations from
government intrusion, the Ministerial Exception constitutionally
protected churches’ decisions regarding the employment of clergy in
instances where those decisions would otherwise violate federal
antidiscrimination laws.38 The Ministerial Exception was not
recognized by the Supreme Court until 2012, when the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission tried to enforce the Americans with Disabilities Act against a Lutheran school in HosannaTabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC.39
C. The Ministerial Exception
Hosanna-Tabor was a sweeping decision, in which the Supreme
Court decreed that a religious congregation retains the right to
choose its own minister, thus enshrining the Ministerial Exception
into First Amendment law.40 Chief Justice Roberts forcefully
declared that “[a] church must be free to choose those who will guide
it on its way.”41 Tellingly, the Court equated the employment
decision with an expression of religious conviction.42 When a
congregation chooses a spiritual leader and makes a hiring decision,
it is expressing core religious values that demand constitutional
protection.43
36. Id. at 116 (footnote omitted).
37. See, e.g., McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558-61 (1972); see also Ian
Bartrum, Religion and Race: The Ministerial Exception Reexamined, 106 NW . U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 191, 191-93 (2011) (“The ministerial exception emerged from the federal judiciary’s
efforts to implement Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in the early 1970s.”).
38. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171,
188-89, 196 (2012).
39. Id. at 177, 180, 196.
40. See id. at 196.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 188-89, 196.
43. See id.
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In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court found the principle of choice
fundamental.44 It concluded that “[b]y imposing an unwanted
minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which
protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission
through its appointments. According the state the power to
determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also
violates the Establishment Clause.”45
This holding was well in line with the cases that led to HosannaTabor, which place the freedom of religious expression as fundamental to the constitutional ethos, both for individuals and
congregations.46 Indeed, the Supreme Court has authorized only a
congregation to decide its own form of religious practice.47 Watson
v. Jones, a bedrock Religion Clause case, rests on the notion that
free exercise is embodied by the ability for a congregation to make
choices for itself.48 In that case, the Court held that “a religious
congregation ... by the nature of its organization, is strictly independent of other ecclesiastical associations, and so far as church
government is concerned, owes no fealty or obligation to any higher
authority.”49
In describing Watson v. Jones in the mid-twentieth century, the
Supreme Court validated the centrality of choice in Religion Clause
cases:
The opinion radiates ... a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation—in
short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and
doctrine. Freedom to select the clergy, where no improper methods of choice are proven, we think, must now be said to have
federal constitutional protection as a part of the free exercise of
religion against state interference.50

44. Id. at 188.
45. Id. at 188-89.
46. See, e.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728-29 (1871).
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. Id. at 722.
50. Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russ. Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S.
94, 115-16 (1952) (footnote omitted).
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A year after Watson was decided, the Supreme Court was tasked
with resolving Bouldin v. Alexander, another inter-denominational
dispute.51 In Bouldin, Washington D.C.’s Third Baptist Church, an
unincorporated religious congregation, became embroiled in an
internal dispute pitting the founder of the Third Baptist Church and
his minority faction against the majority of the congregation that
opposed the installation of the minority’s favored trustees.52
The Court ruled that the congregation’s will and choice were
paramount.53 Writing for the majority, Justice Strong cleverly noted
that the dispute between members of a congregation cannot, in
accordance with the Religion Clauses, be decided upon religious
doctrine: “It may be conceded that we have no power to revise or
question ordinary acts of church discipline, or of excision from
membership. We have only to do with rights of property.”54 The
Court reasoned that respect for the Religion Clauses demands
deference to neutral principles and thus the choices of congregation’s members: In a congregational church, the majority, if they
adhere to the organization and to the doctrines, represent the
church. An expulsion of the majority by a minority is a void act.55
As one commentator noted, this emphasis on the congregation’s
choice is representative of a fidelity to the constitutional values of
the first amendment: “Watson and Bouldin may represent not
simply the pursuit of ‘fair’ outcomes in resolving disputes within
religious bodies, but rather the application of general free exercise
principles.”56
Both Watson and Bouldin, as well as Kedroff, were about the
justiciability of intra-denominational disputes by the Court.57 It is
precisely the concern for individual choice that leads to “[t]he
general rule ... that courts are prohibited by the First Amendment

51. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872).
52. Id. at 137.
53. See id. at 139-40.
54. Id. at 139.
55. Id. at 140.
56. John W. Whitehead, The Conservative Supreme Court and the Demise of the Free
Exercise of Religion, 7 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 1, 18 (1997).
57. See Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russ. Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344
U.S. 94, 95-97 (1952); Bouldin, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 39; Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
679, 713 (1871).
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from getting involved in intra-church disputes when doing so would
require them to become entangled in religious affairs.”58
When faced with a question of justiciability of a lawsuit about the
governance of a religious organization, the core investigation is
whether the dispute can be resolved with neutral legal principles.59
This is because the core value of the First Amendment is that when
there is a question of practice of religious expression, it is only to be
decided by the religious community itself.60 As the Supreme Court
has recognized, “[o]urs is a government which by the ‘law of its
being’ allows no statute, state or national, that prohibits the free
exercise of religion.”61 As the Court has noted, this prohibition also
extends to the actions of the courts.62 While “[t]here are occasions
when civil courts must draw lines between the responsibilities of
church and state for the disposition or use of property....[,] when the
property right follows as an incident from decisions of the church
custom or law on ecclesiastical issues, the church rule controls.”63
The Court has emphasized that “under our Constitution [this
principle] necessarily follows in order that there may be free
exercise of religion.”64
In sum, while the Religion Clause cases directly assess various
forms of government intrusion, they reflect a more fundamental
constitutional value: that the core exercise of religious freedom is
the exercise of religious choices—on one’s own behalf and also on
behalf of religious organizations.
II. FREEDOM IN A RELIGIOUS MARKET
Just as these Religion Clause cases reveal the centrality of choice
in the face of religious codes of conduct, Sherman Act cases address
consumers’ rights to a free market in the face of ethical codes
58. 2 WILLIAM W. BASSETT ET AL., RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 10:44 (2013).
59. See Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
60. See id.; see also Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at
Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970).
61. Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 120.
62. Id. at 120-21.
63. Id. (footnote omitted).
64. Id. at 121.
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imposed by producers.65 An explanation of these seminal Sherman
Act cases illustrates how the Sherman Act adeptly handles the
invocation of ethical codes within a market framework.
A. Markets and Nonmarket Values
The Sherman Act has been used reliably to pierce self-aggrandizing claims that consumers do not benefit from competition or that
antitrust immunity must protect certain privileged roles in the
economy. In the landmark case of Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
the Supreme Court rejected the notion that there was an exemption
to the antitrust laws for the so-called “learned professions.”66 Even
though the Court was addressing restraints imposed by its own
profession, its ruling was clear and unanimous: “The nature of an
occupation, standing alone, does not provide sanctuary from the
Sherman Act.”67 Moreover “the public-service aspect of professional
practice [is not] controlling in determining whether [the Sherman
Act] includes professions.”68
Fundamental to the Sherman Act, then, is a deep commitment to
the rights of consumers to choose their own path, independent of
perceived benefits from “ethical” restraints by producers or professionals of high social status.69 In a case where the restraint on trade
was ostensibly meant to protect the nation’s population from a
scourge of shoddy and dangerous buildings, the Supreme Court held
that “we may assume that competition is not entirely conducive to
ethical behavior, but that is not a reason, cognizable under the
Sherman Act, for doing away with competition.”70 The Court recognized that “the free opportunity to select among alternative offers” goes to “[t]he heart of our national economic policy.”71

65. See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 462-63 (1986); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l
Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 684-85 (1978); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773,
791 (1975).
66. 421 U.S. at 786-87.
67. See id. at 787 (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 7 (1945)).
68. Id. (citing United States v. Nat’l Ass’n. of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 489 (1950)).
69. See id. at 789-90, 792.
70. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 696.
71. Id. at 695 (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951)).
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Doubling down on this principle, the Court found that it was
simply inconsistent with the Sherman Act for organizations of
professionals to disrupt the freedom of choice in a market,72 even
where it is argued “that an unrestrained market in which consumers are given access to the information they believe to be relevant to
their choices will lead them to make unwise and even dangerous
choices.”73 The Court dismissed this argument as “nothing less than
a frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act.”74
In each of these cases, the professionals in question created
intricate codes of ethics that served, altruistically or otherwise, to
limit the ability of the consuming public to partake in an open
market.75 The antitrust case law recognizes very forcefully that the
professional classes cannot be held exempt from the Sherman Act.76
They are not exempt from liability for engaging in the kinds of
forbidden conduct that creates anticompetitive effects.77 It is dangerous, in fact, to assume that codes of ethics will protect markets
against anticompetitive conduct.78
Antitrust law targets codes of ethics precisely because the
promulgators of those codes think they are acting from beneficence.
And because beneficence is more often misplaced paternalism,79
ethical codes that harm consumers are nonetheless difficult to
remove. For these reasons, antitrust cases have a long and effective
history of policing codes of ethics.80 In North Carolina Dental, the
Supreme Court warned against the dangers of confusing selfimposed restraints of a producing class with benevolence in the

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 465-66 (1986).
Id. at 463.
Id. (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 695).
See, e.g., id. at 455-66.
See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 684-85, 695.
See Samuel G. Freedman, Seeing and Battling a ‘Cartel’ in the Hiring of Rabbis, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 24, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/25/us/law-professor-sees-cartel-inhiring-of-rabbis.html [https://perma.cc/N5DR-X7TE] (“Professional cartels are in some ways
even more pernicious than a cartel of manufacturers.... There’s a degree of paternalism. On
the one hand, it’s genuinely born out of concern. The rabbis who run the placement system
really think they know what’s best for their congregations. But by controlling the marketplace
with their ossified rules, they are doing long-lasting damage.”).
80. See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
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form of ethical norms.81 The Court’s concern was that “established
ethical standards may blend with private anticompetitive motives
in a way difficult even for market participants to discern. Dual
allegiances are not always apparent to an actor.”82 And the Court
prescribed a solution too: “In consequence, active market participants cannot be allowed to regulate their own markets free from
antitrust accountability.”83 In proscribing this type of centralized
private regulation, the Court forcefully secured the central position
of the Sherman Act in American life and its role in protecting
consumers’ right to choose.84
B. The Case of a Religious Cartel
In the realm of the practice of religion, a private body is no less
capable of imposing restraints on free expression than the government. This Part articulates how a cartel of ministers, such as the
Rabbinical Assembly, exercises control over the freedom of religion
in a number of ways.85
In the case of the Rabbinical Assembly (RA), the organization
that comprises the Conservative movement’s 1700 rabbis,86 control
over expression is both pervasive and self-perpetuating.87 Membership in the RA is “voluntary, but ... essential,” to being employed by
a congregation that wants to affiliate itself with a particular
movement.88 The RA administers placement commissions that are
81. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1111 (2015).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 1117.
85. I first voiced concern that the Rabbinical Assembly’s (RA’s) practices violated the
antitrust laws in Rabbi Searches Are Tough, but Are They Illegal? FORWARD (Sept. 29, 2010),
https://forward.com/opinion/131723/rabbi-searches-are-tough-but-are-they-illegal/
[https://perma.cc/54X5-XDPE]. The chief motivation was not for the law’s own sake. Id.
(“[R]ecognizing the illegality of the RA’s placement practices forces us to confront many of
Conservative Judaism’s deepest challenges, including the critical importance of heeding the
grassroots needs of Conservative Jews and the creativity of nontraditional congregations.
Ultimately, conforming to the law will be good for congregations, good for the Conservative
movement and it will be good for the RA as well.”); see also supra note 2 and accompanying
text.
86. See Conservative / Masorti Movement, RABBINICAL ASSEMBLY, https://www.rabbinical
assembly.org/about-us/conservative-masorti [https://perma.cc/T3TT-6ZXC].
87. See Richman, supra note 3, at 1369.
88. Id. at 1350.
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restrictive in their rules; restrictions that profoundly impact a
congregation’s right to practice as it chooses.89
The RA’s placement manual for congregations, Aliyah, highlights
these restrictions in bullet form:
• A congregation may search for a rabbi only through the offices
of the [Placement Commission].
• Eligible candidates are those whose resumes are forwarded by
the [Placement Commission].
• A congregation served by the [Placement Commission] shall
not advertise in the media for a rabbi. If a congregation advertises, it will be removed from the Placement List.
• If a congregation interviews a non-RA rabbi without the
specific written approval of the [Placement Commission], the
congregation may be removed from the Placement List.
• If a congregation engages a non-RA rabbi without the specific
written approval of the [Placement Commission], the congregation will lose placement privileges.
• Similar rules apply to rabbinic candidates as well.90

The tension with the principles of the First Amendment’s Religion
Clauses is obvious. For instance, despite Chief Justice Roberts’s
visceral language about the importance of a community choosing its
own minister, the RA has laden that process with restrictions
designed precisely to centralize control over choice.91 That upward
channeling of power from the practicing congregation to the cartel
is anathema to the tradition of free expression embodied by the
Religion Clauses.92
As dangerous as a self-regulated cartel of professionals is to
competition in any field, religious organizations are under unique
threat from that anticompetitive conduct. Religious freedom, manifested by the expression of religious values, is in peril if we fail to
enforce the Sherman Act to preserve fair markets for religion.
89. Id. at 1350-53.
90. ELLIOT SALO SCHOENBERG , ALIYAH : THE RABBINIC SEARCH AS AN UPLIFTING RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE ! 9 (2011), https://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/placement/sitedocs/Aliyahabridged.pdf [https://perma.cc/UEJ5-2U7B]; see also Richman, supra note 3, at 1351 (quoting
an earlier version of Aliyah).
91. Compare SCHOENBERG , supra note 90, at 9, with Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 196 (2012).
92. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196.
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Because of the nature of religious leadership and the sincerity of
congregants in preserving their traditions, there is a natural danger
for market consolidation and exclusionary conduct.93 That conduct
also introduces dynamic costs. For example, a congregation that is
not responsive to its constituents, that cannot be responsive because
of restraints placed on it by a cartel, is destined to fail in the long
run.94 In the short run, the cartel is undeniably infringing on the
congregation’s ability to exercise free expression.95 This is nothing
short of oppression in contradiction to the spirit of the First Amendment of the Constitution.96
Moreover, it is not enough to say, as the RA does, that these
cartel restraints are benign or beneficial.97 As a matter of law, that
is irrelevant in the context of a group boycott.98 As a matter of fact,
disallowing particular market choices is by definition a limit on
expression.99 A congregation’s autonomy is, as we have seen, central
to the vibrancy of religious life in this country.100 A free market for
religious belief, secured by the Sherman Act, preserves religious
liberty, pursuant to the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.
Not only then does the First Amendment not preclude enforcement
of the Sherman Act, it encourages it.
There is a role for ministerial organizations such as the RA. Developing a certification system can help the traditions to maintain
a lineage and authenticity, without imposing a restriction on expression.101 Nonetheless, it is very different to say that a congregation should hire a certain minister because she has been trained
well by us and saying that the congregation must hire a minister
that has been trained by us, as the RA does.102 In the former case,
the congregation still retains its autonomy. That is, the community

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See Richman, supra note 3, at 1350-53.
See id. at 1351-53.
See id.
See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196.
See SCHOENBERG , supra note 90, at 9.
See Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212-13 (1959).
See Richman, supra note 3, at 1355, 1369.
See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196; supra Parts I.B-C.
See Richman, supra note 3, at 1350, 1369-70.
See SCHOENBERG , supra note 90, at 8-9.
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retains its ability to express its religious values and to find a person
to lead it—a fundamental constitutional right of the congregation.103
C. Religious Life in a Free Market
A competitive marketplace for religion is not just mandated by
Constitutional values, it is also the framework that would bring the
greatest social benefit. Just as any competitive marketplace generates superior output and quality than one characterized by
monopolies and cartels, an open marketplace for religion expands
both the availability and quality of religious experience, nurturing
the vibrant religious communities that organizations such as the
RA ostensibly seek. This Section offers a brief sample of the social
science scholarship that examines how alternative market environments shape the health of religious communities. It illustrates
that just as a free market of ideas fosters the development of healthy perspectives, market environments for religions are associated
with largescale religious participation and expression.
Social scientists studying religions, in both the United States and
elsewhere, have concluded that societies in which religions compete
with each other foster greater religious participation.104 In a study
of religious life in Sweden, a country with an established religion,
researchers found evidence that competition was associated with a
more vibrant religious community: “[H]igher degrees of religious
pluralism are associated with higher levels of church attendance.”105
They write that their empirics are in line with market competition
theory:
[A]n analysis of the religious market led us to assume that the
more competition “religious firms” face, the more likely they
would be to adapt their products to the demands of the consumers in order to maintain or increase their market share. We
expected that such adaptation to consumer tastes would make

103. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196.
104. Eva M. Hamberg & Thorlief Pettersson, The Religious Market: Denominational
Competition and Religious Participation in Contemporary Sweden, 33 J. SCI. STUDY RELIGION
205, 205, 214 (1994) (comparing the level of religious participation in Sweden with the United
States).
105. Id. at 206, 212.
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religious consumption higher, the more competitive a religious
market is ... the results were consistent with our theoretical
assumptions.106

Congregationalist structures, which like market organizations are
decentralized and resist hierarchy, especially thrive in competitive
environments.107 As one economist wrote: “Competition in the religious marketplace results in a congregationalist market structure
where each congregation is independently founded and funded by
voluntary contributions from its members.”108
Scholars of American history and religious sociology have made
similar arguments. Sociologists Roger Finke’s and Rodney Stark’s
in The Churching of America describe the American religious landscape as a religious free market, in which “churches compete for
souls.”109 Professor Rick Phillips summarizes Finke’s and Stark’s
hypothesis succinctly: “[W]henever one church enjoys a virtual religious monopoly, rates of participation within the monopoly church
are low, because no single organization can meet the diverse religious needs of an entire society.”110 They thus argue that American
religious life enjoys the vibrancy of a free market in large part because the Religion Clauses prohibit state establishment and ensure
religious competition.111 In contrast, Europe’s tradition of stateestablished denominations secures a monopoly that is unresponsive
to consumer preferences.112 Their argument succinctly connects

106. Id. at 213 (“[E]ven on the nearly monopolistic Swedish religious market, characterized
by a state-supported dominant church, competition, to the (limited) extent that it does exist,
seems to have the effects we would expect: to provide an incentive for the Church of Sweden
to adapt its supply of divine services to the tastes of the consumers.”).
107. Carmel U. Chiswick, Competition vs. Monopoly in the Religious Marketplace: Judaism
in the United States and Israel 4-5 (IZA Discussion Paper No. 7188, 2013), http://ftp.iza.org/dp
7188.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8AA-GUXS].
108. Id.
109. See generally ROGER FINKE & RODNEY STARK , THE CHURCHING OF AMERICA 1776-1990:
WINNERS AND LOSERS IN OUR RELIGIOUS ECONOMY (1992).
110. Rick Phillips, Can Rising Rates of Church Participation Be a Consequence of
Secularization?, 65 SOC. RELIGION 139, 144 (2004) (citing FINKE & STARK , supra note 109).
111. See FINKE & STARK, supra note 109, at 17-21; see also Phillips, supra note 110, at
144.
112. See, e.g., generally Hamberg & Pettersson, supra note 104 (examining the religious
market in Sweden).
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the achievements of the Religion Clauses with the policy objectives
motivating the Sherman Act.
Although Finke’s and Stark’s theories have attracted criticism,
chiefly for their more doctrinaire elements, critics do not disagree
with the role of free religious markets on religious participation.113
Professors Jonathan P. Hill and Daniel V. A. Olsen, in an empirical
assessment of Finke and Stark, support their argument that a free
market for religion spurs innovation and inspires participation:
We suspect that when religious competition motivates religious
suppliers to engage in religious innovation, it less often involves
change among existing religious groups more often involves the
creation of totally new congregations, new religious groups ... or
a major change in the leadership of currently existing congregations.114

Scholars of American Judaism, including those who aim to
advance a normative agenda to strengthen Jewish religious participation, have reached similar conclusions. Dennis W. Carlton and
Avi Weiss—an accomplished antitrust scholar and a renown rabbi,
respectively—present a compelling study of the value and effect of
competition and education within the Jewish experience.115 Professors Carlton and Rabbi Weiss note that as a matter of history,
Judaism has a long tradition, both in practice and in expression, of
encouraging dissent and innovation in the religious marketplace.116
They identify this embrace of dissent as a cherished value and a
sustaining strength of Jewish tradition:
[T]eaching was not the realm of a select few. This failure of any
interest group to relegate Torah teaching to itself carried
through to Talmudic times and later. While restrictions on
general competition arose, Torah teachers typically were free of

113. See generally Jonathan P. Hill & Daniel V. A. Olson, Market Share and Religious
Competition: Do Small Market Share Congregations and Their Leaders Try Harder?, 48 J. SCI.
STUDY RELIGION 629 (2009).
114. Id. at 647.
115. See generally Dennis W. Carlton & Avi Weiss, The Economics of Religion, Jewish
Survival, and Jewish Attitudes Toward Competition in Torah Education, 30 J. LEGAL STUD .
253 (2001).
116. See id. at 260-63, 271-72.
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any such restrictions. It is particularly remarkable that the
scholars—who were in large part in control of Jewish
law—generally chose not to close their profession or enact
restrictions on entry but instead chose to keep competition
thriving in their profession. As the Talmud recognizes, there are
benefits to such competition: “Jealousy among scholars increases
wisdom.”117

This resistance to hierarchy and conformity is a feature, not a
bug, of Jewish tradition, and it reflects the broader findings of social
scientists studying religious life elsewhere. Growth in religious
participation is associated with a lack of centralized control, dissent,
innovation, and competition.118 If religious leaders want to expand
religious participation, they ought to recognize the value of market
mechanisms and competition across religious groups.119 And if they
do not recognize the value of competition, the antitrust laws can
show them the way.
CONCLUSION
The jurisprudential languages of the Sherman Act and the
Religion Clauses go hand in hand, and not merely by accident. Both
are designed to liberate individual energies and resist entrenched
power, and thus both guarantee quintessential market values:
personal freedom, individual expression, and subjective choice. The
recognition by American law that religious life is subject to market
forces does not debase it. To the contrary, it is the free exercise of
market-oriented choice that creates a fertile ground for the development of community worship and practice in the United States.120
For these reasons, we see constitutional values seeping into
Sherman Act cases, and we see Sherman Act principles motivating
Religion Clause cases. This interplay reveals the importance of
continuing to apply the Sherman Act to combat monopolistic and
cartel authority in all facets of life, religious and otherwise.

117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 272.
See id. at 260-63, 271-72.
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.B.

